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How Do We Empathize with Someone Who Is Not
Like Us? A Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Study
Claus Lamm1, Andrew N. Meltzoff2, and Jean Decety1
Abstract
& Previous research on the neural underpinnings of empathy
has been limited to affective situations experienced in a simi-
lar way by an observer and a target individual. In daily life we
also interact with people whose responses to affective stimuli
can be very different from our own. How do we understand
the affective states of these individuals? We used functional
magnetic resonance imaging to assess how participants em-
pathize with the feelings of patients who reacted with no pain
to surgical procedures but with pain to a soft touch. Empathy
for pain of these patients activated the same areas (insula,
medial/anterior cingulate cortex) as empathy for persons who
responded to painful stimuli in the same way as the observer.
Empathy in a situation that was aversive only for the observer
but neutral for the patient recruited areas involved in self–
other distinction (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) and cognitive
control (right inferior frontal cortex). In addition, effective
connectivity between the latter and areas implicated in af-
fective processing was enhanced. This suggests that inferring
the affective state of someone who is not like us can rely
upon the same neural structures as empathy for someone
who is similar to us. When strong emotional response ten-
dencies exist though, these tendencies have to be overcome by
executive functions. Our results demonstrate that the fronto-
cortical attention network is crucially involved in this pro-
cess, corroborating that empathy is a f lexible phenomenon
which involves both automatic and controlled cognitive mecha-
nisms. Our findings have important implications for the un-
derstanding and promotion of empathy, demonstrating that
regulation of one’s egocentric perspective is crucial for under-
standing others. &
INTRODUCTION
A growing number of neuroimaging studies document a
striking overlap in the neural underpinnings of the first-
hand experience of pain and its perception in others
(see Jackson, Rainville, & Decety, 2006, for a review).
This overlap is most consistent in areas coding affective–
motivational aspects of pain, such as the anterior and
mid-cingulate cortex and anterior insula (AI) (e.g., Lamm,
Batson, & Decety, 2007; Singer et al., 2004). In addition,
areas processing the sensory-discriminative aspect of
pain also seem to be activated by the perception of pain
in others (e.g., Cheng et al., 2007, 2008; Bufalari, Aprile,
Avenanti, Di Russo, & Aglioti, 2007; Lamm, Nusbaum,
Meltzoff, & Decety, 2007; Moriguchi et al., 2007). These
findings lend credence to the idea that empathy draws
upon automatic somatic and somatosensory resonance
between other and self, offering a possible (yet only par-
tial) route to understanding the mental states of others
(Decety & Meyer, 2008; Decety & Gre`zes, 2006; Decety
& Jackson, 2004). This resonance seems to rely upon the
perception–action coupling mechanism which under-
pins processes such as emotional contagion (Preston &
de Waal, 2002).
An important gap in the neuroscientific investigation
of empathy is that previous work exclusively created af-
fective situations that could have been experienced in
a similar or identical way by both the observer and the
afflicted person (the target). Therefore, our knowledge
about how we empathize with people who are not like
us is limited. This question is of high ecological validity,
as many everyday situations require understanding
others whose experiences, attitudes, and response ten-
dencies are different from our own. The question of how
we empathize with dissimilar others is also interesting
on a theoretical level because it stresses the cognitive com-
ponent of empathy. This component is perhaps unique
to humans and possibly apes (De Waal, 2006; Decety &
Lamm, 2006), and crucially relies upon the awareness of
self–other distinction and executive functions—including
controlled attention for activating relevant representa-
tions and keeping them in an active state while inhibiting
irrelevant ones. For instance, a recent fMRI study demon-
strated that physicians who practice acupuncture activate
dorsolateral and medial prefrontal cortex, and not the pain
matrix (as control participants did), when they are visually
presented with body parts being pricked by needles, and1The University of Chicago, 2The University of Washington
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that this activation correlates with decreased activation of
the AI (Cheng et al., 2007). Similarly, perceiving stimuli
which are painful and aversive for the self but known to be
nonpainful for the target (such as surgery performed on
an anesthetized body part) recruited areas involved in
self–other distinction and prefrontal cortex underpinning
affective appraisal (Lamm, Nusbaum, et al., 2007).
The aim of the current study, therefore, was to ex-
amine the neural response to situations in which the
observer is requested to empathize with a person who
is not like her or him, as opposed to a person sharing
one’s own bodily experience. To this end, we created
situations that the observer and the target shared, and
contrasted them with situations in which the symmetry
between observer and target was broken. This was im-
plemented by presenting pictures of two groups of tar-
gets experiencing needle injections or being touched by
a soft object (a Q-tip). One group of targets responded
to these situation in the same way the participants
would respond to them (similar patients, responding
with pain to injections, and with no pain to touch),
whereas the second group reacted in an opposite, non-
shared way due to a neurological dysfunction (dissimi-
lar patients, who responded with pain to soft touch,
and with no pain to injections). Participants were in-
structed to imagine the feelings of the targets in order
to share and evaluate their affective states. The valence
of the shared feelings could therefore be either neutral
(in the case of nonpainful stimulations) or negative (in
the case of painful stimulations).
An increasing number of social neuroscience studies
suggest that the experience of empathy is a flexible phe-
nomenon, which is malleable by a number of moti-
vational, situational, and dispositional factors (Hein &
Singer, 2008; Decety & Lamm, 2006; Hodges & Wegner,
1997). Empathic responses can be generated even in
the absence of direct perception of the other’s emotion-
al response, by means of imagery, perspective-taking,
and other types of top–down control. Therefore, we
predicted that empathy for dissimilar targets would rely
upon areas overlapping with those involved in empathy
for similar targets. Hence, empathy for pain triggered
by a neutral stimulus was expected to activate areas
crucial during empathy for pain (AI, cingulate cortex; see
Jackson, Rainville, et al., 2006, for a review). In addition,
neural circuits involved in self–other distinction and ex-
ecutive function are predicted to subserve perspective-
taking and the regulation of the observer’s egocentric
response tendencies (Decety, 2005). For the former,
stronger responses in dorsal medial prefrontal cortex
(dmPFC) were predicted, as this region is related to
adopting the perspective of dissimilar others (e.g.,
Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006); increased activation
was also expected for the right temporo-parietal junc-
tion (TPJ) (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008; Decety &
Lamm, 2007). Inhibition of egocentric affective responses
was predicted to recruit right inferior frontal cortex
(rIFC), as this area plays an important role in response
inhibition and cognitive control (e.g., Brass, Derrfuss,
Forstmann, & Von Cramon, 2005; Aron, Robbins, &
Poldrack, 2004). Using effective connectivity analyses,
we explored whether this inhibition was achieved by
stronger functional interactions with neural networks
associated with affective coding. Notably, we expected
neural and behavioral effects to be strongest in situations
where stronger pre-established emotional response ten-
dencies existed in the observer, that is, in participants
watching dissimilar targets undergoing needle injections.
In order to test these predictions, we performed an
event-related fMRI study. Functional segregation fMRI
analyses were used to localize the brain areas involved in
sharing the target’s affect. In addition, select effective
connectivity analyses assessed the neural interaction be-
tween these areas and trait measures of perspective-taking
were correlated with hemodynamic responses to assess
brain–behavior relationships more specifically.
METHODS
Participants
Twenty-four right-handed healthy volunteers aged be-
tween 19 and 34 years participated in the fMRI study. An
independent group of 23 participants was recruited for
an eye-tracking control study (age range = 20–35 years,
23 right-handed, 12 men). All participants gave informed
written consent; were paid for participation; and re-
ported no history of neurological, psychiatric, or major
medical disorder and no current use of psychoactive
medications. The study was approved by the local Ethics
Committees (The University of Chicago and University
of Oregon, where scanning was performed), and con-
ducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Sample size for the MRI study was chosen based upon
general statistical power considerations for fMRI studies
(Murphy & Garavan, 2004; Desmond & Glover, 2002) and
upon power estimates from previous studies using simi-
lar designs (Lamm, Batson, et al., 2007; Lamm, Nusbaum,
et al., 2007; Jackson, Brunet, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2006;
Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, 2005; Singer et al., 2004).
One participant was excluded due to a general lack of
activation in task-related areas and behavioral data sug-
gesting lack of compliance with task instructions, result-
ing in a final sample size of 23 participants (age M =
24.522, SE = 0.893; 12 women).
Experimental Design
Participants watched color photographs of human left
hands or right upper arms either being touched by a
Q-tip or receiving an injection using a hypodermic
needle (Figure 1). Stimuli had been validated in a behav-
ioral study with n = 115 participants confirming that
needle injections are perceived as considerably painful.
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Participants were instructed to share the affect of the tar-
gets by vividly imagining the pain (or nonpain) caused by
the displayed situations. According to the cover story,
the photographs had been taken from two different
groups of targets. Neurological patients (dissimilar
others) ostensibly suffered from a rare neurological dis-
ease causing pain when touched by a soft object (such
as a Q-tip), but experienced a touch-like sensation and
no pain when being pricked by a needle. Normal patients
(similar others) also suffered from a disease (Tinnitus
aurium), but this disease was unrelated to their somato-
sensation and nociception. Therefore, they reacted to
needle injections with pain and to being touched by a
Q-tip with touch and no pain. Hence, the design im-
plemented in this study was a 2  2 factorial design, with
the factors target (dissimilar and similar patient) and
stimulus (needle and Q-tip). Crucially, depending upon
the target, identical stimuli could have either painful
or nonpainful consequences. Also, because the goal of
this study was the observation of pain in others, at no
point did the participants themselves receive any painful
stimulation.
Stimuli were presented in blocks of 12 trials, with
block order being counterbalanced across participants. An
instruction screen at the beginning of each block showed
a picture of the patient, which informed participants
about the group of patients the following 12 photo-
graphs had been taken off. A trial consisted of a photo-
graph of a hand or an arm displayed for a duration
varying between 2 and 5 TRs (2420 and 6050 msec; mean
duration 3 TRs) followed either by a response screen
or a white fixation cross on black background (inter-
stimulus interval [ISI]). ISIs were randomly varied be-
tween 2 and 5 TRs (mean duration = 2.5 TRs). Stimulus
and ISI durations were varied to optimize extraction of
task-related event-related responses versus responses re-
lated to unspecific effects such as stimulus perception
or orienting (e.g., Ecker, Brammer, David, & Williams,
2006). Responses either required rating the amount of
pain felt by the target using a visual analog scale (VAS) or
a forced-choice matching task (see below). Thirty trials
were run for each of the four conditions (15 trials for
each body part). Design efficiency was optimized by
generating various trial sequences (with randomly var-
ied stimulus duration, condition order, ISI duration,
and response requests) and their associated design
matrices. Regressors in these matrices were convolved
with the canonical hemodynamic response function
(hrf ) and tested for collinearity between regressors
(i.e., the four task conditions, as well as between stimuli
and responses) and the efficiency of the target contrasts
(Henson, 2007).
In addition, it was assessed whether the conscious
perception of needle injections into others is sufficient
to trigger a response in areas of the so-called pain matrix
(Derbyshire, 2000), or whether attention to the affective
consequences of the stimulation is required. This was in-
vestigated in a separate scanning run (henceforth called
automaticity localizer) in which needle injections and
Q-tip stimuli were presented (for 800 msec) with the in-
struction to pay close attention to the physical charac-
teristics of the photographs in order to indicate whether
a certain photograph deviated from the other ones by
some unspecified unusual attribute (such as a missing
tip of a needle, which was the case in 3 out of the 90 stim-
uli). Finally, primary and secondary somatosensory areas
involved in the perception of normal touch were individ-
ually localized in a separate scanning run (labeled touch
localizer). This run consisted of 12 blocks in which either
the left hand or the right upper arm where repetitively
touched (frequency 2 Hz) for a duration of 20 sec. A rest
baseline of equal length but with no stimulation was
interspersed between blocks, with block order randomly
alternating and counterbalanced.
Dispositional and Behavioral Measures
Three self-report dispositional questionnaires were filled
in several weeks before the fMRI experiment and with
participants being blind to the experiment’s purpose:
the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1994), the Emo-
tional Contagion Scale (Doherty, 1997), and the Empa-
thy Quotient (Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). The
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) is the most widely
used self-report measure of dispositional empathy. Im-
portantly, it contains a perspective-taking subscale which
was of particular interest in this study (see below). The
Emotional Contagion Scale (ECS) assesses the suscepti-
bility to other’s emotions from afferent feedback gener-
ated by mimicry, using questions such as ‘‘I clench my jaws
Figure 1. Sample stimuli used in the study. Inserts ‘‘painful’’ and
‘‘nonpainful’’ were not presented to participants and are provided
for illustrative purposes.
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and my shoulders get tight when I see the angry faces on
the news.’’ The Empathy Quotient (EQ) was used as an
alternative assessment of dispositional empathy.
Behavioral measures during scanning included pain
ratings using a VAS (with scores ranging from 0 = no
pain to 100 = very severe pain) and a forced-choice
matching task (see Figure 2, response collection). Re-
sponses were requested randomly for 50% of the trials.
The VAS measured the amount of pain imagined by par-
ticipants, and response time was determined as the time
from scale onset until first movement of the cursor. In
the forced-choice matching task, the patient’s face was
shown either expressing pain or a neutral expression.
Participants had to decide whether the displayed ex-
pression matched the target’s affective state as imagined
during the preceding stimulus presentation. The ratio-
nale for using two different response types as well as re-
sponse omissions was to decrease response preparation
during performance of the pain imagery task—such as
preparing the VAS response already before stimulus offset.
After scanning, emotional responses in the four experi-
mental conditions were assessed using a procedure pro-
posed by Batson, Early, and Salvarini (1997). Participants
were shown two trials of each condition (counterbalanced
across participants) and rated the degree to which they
experienced 14 emotional states while imagining the tar-
get’s pain (e.g., alarmed, concerned, compassionate, dis-
tressed; 0 = not at all, 6 = extremely). Ratings of emotional
states were aggregated by calculating empathic concern
and personal distress indices (Batson et al., 1997 for de-
tails). Indices were analyzed using repeated measures
ANOVAs with factors target, stimulus, and index. Behav-
ioral data and dispositional measures were analyzed
using SPSS 15.0 for Windows (SPSS, Chicago, IL), and
STATISTICA 5.1 for linear contrasts (Stat Soft, Tulsa, OK),
with a p = .05 significance threshold for all analyses.
MRI Scanning
MRI data were acquired on a 3-Tesla Siemens Magnetom
Allegra equipped with a standard quadrature head coil.
Changes in BOLD signal were measured using a T2*-
weighted single-shot echo-planar imaging (EPI) se-
quence (repetition time [TR] = 1210 msec, echo time
[TE] = 30 msec, flip angle = 808, 20 axial slices/volume
with 5 mm slice thickness and 0.5 mm interslice gap,
Figure 2. Block and trial structure used in the fMRI experiment.
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in-plane resolution = 3.125  3.125 mm2, 64  64 ma-
trix, FOV 200  200 mm2, ascending interleaved slice
acquisition, whole-brain coverage excluding lower parts
of the cerebellum in some participants). The effective
temporal resolution was increased to 605 msec (1/2 TR)
by synchronizing half of the acquisition onsets with stim-
ulus onset and the other half with 1/2 TR after stimulus
onset (Miezin, Maccotta, Ollinger, Petersen, & Buckner,
2000). Each run was preceded by several dummy scans
ensuring steady-state magnetization conditions. Stimulus
presentation and response collection were performed
using the Presentation software (Neurobehavioural Sys-
tems, Albany, CA). Visual stimuli were presented using
a back-projection system and a button box recorded the
responses of subjects, which were entered using their
dominant right hand. For the experimental conditions,
three runs separated by short breaks and with 535 TRs
per run were performed, with 333 volumes acquired for
the automaticity localizer and 332 volumes acquired for
the touch localizer run.
MRI Analyses
Image processing was performed using SPM5 (Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK), im-
plemented in MATLAB 7 (Mathworks, Sherborn, MA). Pre-
processing included, in the following order, slice-timing
correction (reference slice including superior–inferior
center of the AI), correction for head motion (realignment
to mean image volume, using the default unwarp and
realign function to account for susceptibility–movement
interactions in orbito-frontal regions), normalization from
the mean realigned and unwarped EPI image to the EPI
template provided in SPM5 (normalization performed
using default SPM parameters), and smoothing using a
6-mm FWHM isotropic Gaussian kernel. Event-related
responses were assessed by setting up fixed effects gen-
eral linear models for each subject. Regressors of inter-
est modeling the experimental conditions (separately for
hand and arm stimuli), the instruction display and the
response epochs were set up and convolved with the
canonical hrf. All models included a high-pass filter with
a cutoff at 128 sec in order to remove scanner drifts.
The three runs were concatenated for all analyses, with
run-specific effects considered in the model as regressors
of no interest.
Analyses of Functional Segregation (Localization)
Following model estimation, contrasts were calculated
for each subject to assess differences between conditions.
In addition, signal changes in relation to the implicitly
modeled fixation baseline were assessed. The resulting
first-level contrast images were entered into second-level
random effects (rfx) analyses to assess differences be-
tween conditions with population inference. Activation
differences against baseline were interpreted using a
voxel-level threshold of p = .05 and a spatial extent
threshold of k = 20, corrected for multiple comparisons
using random field theory. The more subtle activation
differences between conditions were assessed using a
voxel-level threshold of p = .001 and k = 20 (uncorrected
for multiple comparisons). Selection of an appropriate
statistical threshold in functional neuroimaging is a con-
troversially discussed problem (e.g., Poldrack et al.,
2008). The chosen thresholding approach is in line with
a multitude of other studies assessing empathy for pain
(Lamm, Batson, et al., 2007; Lamm, Nusbaum, et al., 2007;
Jackson, Brunet, et al., 2006; Jackson, Rainville, et al.,
2006; Singer et al., 2004, 2006; Jackson et al., 2005), which
show highly replicable and well-segregated activations
in the pain matrix. Our threshold therefore enables
direct comparability of results, and it also reflects our
experience with the effect sizes typically encountered
in social neuroscience paradigms. Note, though, that in
all analyses without correction for multiple comparisons,
we do not have quantified control over the amount of
false positives.
Whether trait perspective-taking skills correlated with
hemodynamic responses in dmPFC and rIFC was assessed
by correlating parameter estimates of clusters in these
regions from the contrasts No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar
and Pain: Dissimilar > Similar with (mean-normalized)
scores of the perspective-taking subscale of the IRI. We
predicted higher response inhibition and self–other dis-
tinction, indexed by dmPFC and rIFC, to be correlated
with higher perspective-taking skills.
Significant clusters were anatomically labeled using
structural neuroanatomy information and probabilistic
cytoarchitectonic maps provided in the Anatomy Tool-
box (version 1.4; Eickhoff et al., 2005) and the Anatomic
Automatic Labeling toolbox (Tzourio-Mazoyer et al., 2002).
For brain regions not covered by these toolboxes, a brain
atlas (Duvernoy, 1991) was used. Nomenclature for acti-
vations in cingulate cortex was based on a recent review
of cingulate anatomy and function (Vogt, 2005). Caret5
(Washington University; http://brainmap.wustl.edu; Van
Essen et al., 2001) was used to visualize SPMs on the sur-
face of cerebral cortex for SI Figure 1.
Exploratory data analyses showed stronger behavioral
and neural responses to stimuli showing hands (irrespec-
tive of the target group). Because the efficiency of the
current event-related design was particularly high due to
the high temporal resolution, the variation of stimulus
durations, and the optimization of design efficiency (Ecker
et al., 2006; Miezin et al., 2000), we restricted analyses to
trials showing hand stimuli (n = 15 per condition). This
also applied to the behavioral analyses.
Analyses of Effective Connectivity (PPI)
Although functional segregation analyses inform about
whether a brain area is active during an experimental
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paradigm, the goal of effective connectivity analyses is to
assess whether the influence two neural networks exert
over each other is modulated by certain psychological
factors (Friston et al., 1997). To this end, psychophysio-
logical interaction (PPI) analyses determine whether the
effective connectivity between a seed region and all
other voxels in the brain is changed by an experimental
condition of interest. Based upon the hypothesis that
dmPFC and rIFC would be involved in empathizing with
dissimilar others, we explored PPIs for volumes of in-
terest (VOIs) in these areas. rIFC was assessed for its
crucial role in response inhibition and action decoding
(Aron et al., 2004), whereas dmPFC has been specifically
associated with perspective-taking and reasoning about
dissimilar others (D’Argembeau et al., 2007; Mitchell
et al., 2006). Given the central role of the right AI in
empathy for pain, we explored whether connectivity of
this region with other areas associated with affective
coding and interoceptive awareness would increase
(Decety & Lamm, 2006; Jackson, Brunet, et al., 2006;
Jackson, Rainville, et al., 2006). All VOIs were defined as
a 6-mm-radius sphere, with the center of this sphere
being the individually determined local maximum clos-
est to the respective cluster maximum determined by
the rfx main effect of the segregation analysis (i.e., mean
of all four conditions > baseline). The reason for using
the mean activation instead of the more specific contrast
No Pain: Dissimilar other > Similar other was because
the latter would have biased the PPI analyses to areas
found to be active during that contrast. The significance
threshold for VOI extraction was set to p = .001, k = 5
(uncorrected). In case no significant voxels were de-
tected, no VOI data were extracted for that participant.
Given the scarcity of effective connectivity analyses in
the domain of empathy for pain, PPI analyses were of a
rather exploratory nature, which is one reason for using
a more liberal threshold than for the segregation anal-
yses. As a safeguard against false positives, results were
only interpreted for areas showing significant responses
in the functional segregation analyses (which also sub-
stantially reduced the number of statistical comparisons).
Also, given the results of the functional segregation
analyses, which did not reveal higher activation in any
of the a priori expected areas, PPI analyses were restricted
to the contrast No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar.
PPI analyses were performed in the following way: (a)
extraction of the time-series data of the first eigenvariate
of the seed VOI (high-pass filtered and mean corrected,
BOLD-deconvolved to get an estimate of the actual
neural response; Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, & Friston,
2003); (b) generating a vector contrasting the time
series of the estimated neural response for the targeted
conditions (representing the interaction between the
psychological and physiological factors, i.e., the PPI re-
gressor), a second vector representing the main effect
of the selected contrast (the psychological variable, i.e.,
the P regressor), and a third vector representing the VOI
time course (the physiological variable, Y regressor); and
(c) forward-convolving these regressors with the canoni-
cal hrf in order to estimate the effects of the PPI re-
gressor. The resulting statistical parametric maps (SPMs)
showed clusters for which connectivity differed in the
chosen conditions.
Tracking of Eye Movements
Averting the gaze from aversive situations is a potential
emotion regulation strategy. This strategy has been
associated with activation in brain areas that are also re-
lated to perspective-taking and self–other distinction
(van Reekum et al., 2007). In our paradigm, overcoming
one’s egocentric aversive response when watching nee-
dle injections into dissimilar others might have been
achieved by averting the gaze. In order to exclude this
interpretation and to make sure that activations in our
study were not confounded by different eye gaze pat-
terns, we performed a control study using eye tracking
outside of the MRI scanner. This study was performed
with an independent group of participants to avoid
habituation and practice effects. Eye movements were
recorded with a Tobii T120 eye tracker (Tobii Technol-
ogy AB, Danderyd, Sweden) using a 120-Hz data sam-
pling rate and an automatic calibration procedure using
9 calibration points. Stimulus presentation (visual angle,
luminance, and screen resolution) and the experimental
paradigm were kept as similar as possible to the fMRI
paradigm. Eight randomly permuted blocks (four for
each patient group) with eight randomly permuted
stimuli were presented, with stimulus duration being
2 sec, resulting in a total of 16 trials per conditions. Data
were analyzed using Tobii Studio (v 1.1.12), using the
in-built automatic fixation detection algorithm (Tobii
Fixation Filter, detection radius 35 pixels on a screen
with a resolution of 1280  1024 pixels). Circular areas
of interest (AOIs) with a radius of 64 pixels were drawn
centered on the points where the needle penetrated or
where the Q-tip touched the skin. Fixation duration for
these AOIs was determined for the last 1500 msec of
image display. The first 500 msec were discarded be-
cause eye movements during this interval were related
to moving the gaze from the centrally located fixation
cross preceding each task stimulus to the stimulus of
interest itself (i.e., the contact point between needle/
Q-tip and hand). A repeated measures ANOVA was per-
formed to assess differences in fixation durations be-
tween conditions. In addition, we used heat map, gaze
plot, and bee swarm visualizations to explore the dy-
namics of eye movements and to assess patterns that
might have been missed by the AOI analysis. These analy-
ses visualized fixation times for all aspects of the picture
[heat maps and the temporal sequence of registered
fixations (gaze plots)], and dynamically visualized all gaze
changes from stimulus onset until offset as a movie (bee
swarm).
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results and Dispositional Measures
Pain ratings using the VAS were in line with the actual
affective states of the targets [Figure 3; significant inter-
action Target  Stimulus: F(1, 22) = 1891.558, p < .001,
partial h2 = 0.989]. Injections into dissimilar others were
rated as significantly more painful than the equally pain-
less stimulations (Q-tip) of similar others [linear contrast
No pain: Dissimilar vs. Similar: F(1, 22) = 10.687, p =
.004, partial h2 = 0.486]. Analysis of response times
revealed that response time was longest for needle
injections into dissimilar others, whereas response times
for painful stimuli did not differ [significant interaction
Target  Stimulus: F(1, 22) = 5.520, p = .028, partial
h2 = 0.201; linear contrast No pain: Dissimilar vs.
Similar: F(1, 22) = 4.09, p = .055, partial h2 = 0.186;
injection into dissimilar other (M ± SE) = 1366 ±
56 msec, touch of similar other = 1224 ± 79 msec].
No significant differences (either for ratings or for re-
sponse times) were obtained when contrasting painful
stimulation of dissimilar with painful stimulation of simi-
lar others.
When matching the facial expression associated with
the emotional state of a patient to its actual affective
state (forced choice matching task), the percentage of
incorrect answers was significantly higher for dissimilar
others—in particular, for the needle injections (Likeli-
hood ratio test, p = .044; similar other injection = 3%,
touch = 0.6% vs. dissimilar other injection = 8.7%,
touch = 2.69%). Also, response times in the matching
task were longer for needle injections into dissimilar
others [interaction Target  Stimulus: F(1, 22) = 11.402,
p = .003, partial h2 = 0.341; mean ± SE of response
times, similar other injection = 1595 ± 103 msec, touch =
1679 ± 355 msec; dissimilar injection = 2090 ± 767 msec,
touch = 1679 ± 287 msec].
Empathic concern (EC) and personal distress (PD)
triggered by witnessing the patients’ affective states were
higher for painful stimulations (i.e., touch of dissimilar
others, injections into similar others; Figure 3, right-
hand side). Although EC for matched stimulation con-
sequences did not differ between targets, PD was higher
during injections into dissimilar others [significant three-
way interaction Target  Stimulus  Scale: F(1, 23) =
11.442, p = .003, partial h2 = 0.342; post hoc linear
contrast PD injection dissimilar other vs. touch similar
other: F(1, 22) = 10.459, p = .001, partial h2 = 0.63].
Dispositional measures (SI Table 1) were well within
published norms and comparable to previous neuro-
imaging studies (e.g., Lamm, Batson, et al., 2007; Lamm,
Nusbaum, et al., 2007).
fMRI Results
Functional Segregation (Localization)
The first step was to determine whether activation pat-
terns associated with empathy for pain experienced by
similar others was consistent with previous studies. This
was clearly the case, as the contrast Pain > No Pain:
Similar others revealed signal changes in large parts
of the pain matrix involved in the first-hand experience
of pain, such as bilateral anterior insular cortex, medial
cingulate cortex (MCC) and anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC), as well as various sensorimotor areas. This consis-
tency check enabled us to assess differences between
the target groups.
Dissimilar > similar targets. Brain activity triggered
by empathizing with the pain of a target that is dissimilar
to the observer was assessed using the contrast Pain >
No Pain: Dissimilar (i.e., Q-tip touch vs. needle injec-
tion into a dissimilar target). This revealed clusters which
vastly overlapped with those found for Pain > No
pain: Similar, including key structures of the pain ma-
trix such as bilateral AI, MCC and ACC, medial dorsal and
Figure 3. Pain, personal distress, and empathic concern ratings (mean plus standard error of the mean, SE) for the four different conditions.
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ventrolateral premotor areas, inferior and superior parie-
tal cortex, as well as thalamus and striatum (Figure 4). In
order to determine whether these areas showed stronger
activation than during pain empathy for similar others, we
calculated the contrast Pain: Dissimilar > Similar (i.e.,
Q-tip touch of dissimilar vs. needle injection into similar
target). This contrast revealed no significant differences,
even when lowering the threshold to p = .005, k = 5
(uncorrected).
Subsequently, we assessed the neural network in-
volved in overcoming one’s emotional response to an
aversive stimulus that is neutral for the other using the
contrast No pain: Dissimilar > Similar (i.e., needle in-
jection into a dissimilar patient vs. a Q-tip touching a
similar patient; note that both conditions are equally
nonpainful). This contrast revealed higher activation in
several cortical and subcortical areas, including dmPFC,
rIFC, bilateral AI, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
(dACC), dorsal and ventrolateral striatum (head of the
caudate and pallidum), inferior parietal lobule (supra-
marginal gyrus), and a number of occipital areas in-
volved in visual processing (Table 1 and Figure 5).
Similar > dissimilar targets. The contrast Pain: Simi-
lar > Dissimilar other (i.e., needle injection into similar
patient vs. Q-tip touch of dissimilar patient) assessed
which areas showed stronger responses during empa-
thy for pain in similar patients. It revealed significant clus-
ters in the contralateral (right) postcentral gyrus (primary
somatosensory cortex), supplementary motor area and
right dorsolateral premotor cortex, MCC and cingulate
motor area, left fronto-insular cortex, and in various
other cortical and subcortical areas (SI Table 2). Notably,
activation in the contralateral postcentral gyrus substan-
tially overlapped with independently determined clusters
related to hand somatosensation (touch localizer; SI
Figure 1).
Automaticity localizer. The automaticity localizer
showed no activation in any area of the pain matrix,
not even at a very liberal threshold of p = .05 (uncor-
rected for multiple comparisons, no extent threshold;
contrast Injection > baseline). The only significant clus-
ters (both for the needle and Q-tip stimuli) were located
in visual cortical areas such as bilateral medial and lateral
occipital cortex and superior parietal cortex.
Brain–behavior correlations. The correlation of
perspective-taking scores with parameter estimates from
the contrast No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar revealed a
significant cluster in rIFC, with peak coordinates x/y/z =
50/4/22, and a (peak) correlation of r = .62. No signifi-
cant correlations were observed in other areas identified
in this study, including the cluster in dmPFC. The same
applies to correlation analyses using parameter esti-
mates from the contrast Pain: Dissimilar > Similar.
Functional Integration—PPI Analyses
PPI analyses were performed for the individually identi-
fied VOIs listed in SI Table 3. PPIs for the contrast No
Pain: Dissimilar > Similar for dmPFC showed connec-
tivity increases almost exclusively with occipital (medial
and lateral) and superior parietal areas, and no modu-
lation of connectivity with areas specifically associated
with affect processing and pain empathy. In contrast,
rIFC’s connectivity increased with dACC, right AI, the
periaqueductal gray, and the putamen (Figure 6). Con-
nectivity of the right AI increased with other affect-
encoding areas, such as dACC, left AI, the periaqueductal
gray, and the striatum (caudate and putamen; Figure 7).
Eye Movements
In all four conditions, participants spent the majority
of time (on average, about 1200 msec of the analyzed
1500 msec) looking at those parts of the stimulus de-
picting the object penetrating or touching the target’s
hand (SI Table 4, SI Figure 2). The main effects of the
repeated measures ANOVA were nonsignificant ( ps >
.227), but the interaction was [F(1, 21) = 7.831, p =
.011, partial h2 = 0.272; data of one participant had to
be excluded due to equipment failure]. This interaction
was driven by fixation time for injections into similar
others being disproportionately longer than those for
Q-tip touch, as compared to dissimilar targets (SI
Table 4). Note though that differences between condi-
tions were generally very small (around 50 msec from
the mean across all conditions), indicating that in no
condition did participants spend considerably different
amounts of time averting their gaze from the object. Note,
in particular, that needle injections into dissimilar others
did not result in reduced fixation times when compared
to nonpainful touch of similar others [linear contrast F(1,
21) = 0.263, p = .613]. In addition, qualitative analyses of
Figure 4. Significant clusters in selected brain regions from the
contrast Pain > No Pain: Dissimilar others. Thresholded activation
( p = .001, k = 20, uncorrected) is overlaid on sagittal views of a
high-resolution structural brain scan in standard stereotactic space
(MNI). Red numbers indicate slice number in x/y/z direction.
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Table 1. Significant Differences from the Functional Segregation Contrast No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar Other
Cluster Size k t x y z Anatomical Location and Area
Frontal and Insular Cortex
264 8.32 16 16 60 dorsomedial PFC
X 4.97 4 14 62 SMA (area 6)
X 4.75 6 22 48 dorsomedial PFC
1007 7.84 60 12 18 vPMC, pars opercularis (area 44)
X 7.00 58 20 22 vPMC, pars triangularis (area 45)
X 6.70 54 12 30 vPMC, pars opercularis (area 44)
309 5.29 48 6 16 vPMC, Rolandic operculum (area 44)
X 5.26 50 22 2 vPMC, pars triangularis (area 45)
X 4.86 52 8 6 vPMC, pars opercularis (area 44)
65 4.49 42 44 2 IFG
29 4.35 44 30 20 vPMC, pars triangularis (area 45)
21 4.36 60 6 22 vPMC (area 44)
142 5.11 44 28 6 IFG, pars orbitalis
X 4.71 36 18 4 anterior insular cortex
26 4.85 6 32 42 superior frontal gyrus
25 4.64 48 36 32 middle frontal gyrus
Occipital and Temporal Cortex
73 5.88 36 94 4 middle occipital gyrus
311 5.72 52 58 18 inferior temporal gyrus
X 5.25 50 60 10 inferior temporal gyrus
X 5.12 54 70 8 inferior temporal gyrus
304 5.54 56 70 2 middle temporal/inferior occipital gyrus
X 5.31 48 74 10 inferior occipital gyrus
X 5.13 46 76 2 inferior occipital gyrus
75 5.09 38 92 6 middle occipital gyrus
X 5.04 38 92 6 inferior occipital gyrus
X 3.79 36 82 2 middle occipital gyrus
40 4.48 32 76 40 middle occipital gyrus
53 4.36 36 90 20 middle occipital gyrus
X 4.05 40 88 12 middle occipital gyrus
66 4.32 16 86 8 calcarine sulcus/cuneus
Parietal Cortex
275 5.25 58 30 52 inferior parietal lobule/SMG
X 4.85 62 24 42 inferior parietal lobule/SMG
X 4.32 36 38 48 SMG/postcentral gyrus
204 5.05 58 42 46 inferior parietal lobule
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the dynamics of eye movements did not indicate any other
differences between conditions.
DISCUSSION
Previous neurophysiological explorations of empathy
were limited to situations in which affective stimuli trig-
gered the same response in both the observer and the
target. This paradigm cannot address the question of
how we understand someone who is not like us, and
whose affective responses are not matched to our own.
We investigated this question by reversing the stimulus–
response mapping of target and observer, preventing
the latter to infer the targets’ mental and affective states
by using a direct perception–action coupling mechanism.
On the contrary, participants had to rely upon perspective-
taking and other cognitive mechanisms of top–down ex-
ecutive control in order to understand the sensations
and feelings. Although we expected such effects irrespec-
tive of the affective state of the target, we predicted that
cognitive control would be more pronounced for more
firmly established response tendencies—such as when
observing someone else receiving an injection which would
be aversive and painful for the observer, but not for the
target.
The behavioral and hemodynamic results are largely
in line with these predictions. Painful stimulation of dis-
similar others with an object that was neutral for the
observer resulted in extensive activation of the pain ma-
trix, in particular in areas coding affect such as the bi-
lateral AI, MCC, and ACC. This indicates that sharing the
painful affective state of dissimilar targets relies upon neu-
ral mechanisms that are also at play when empathizing
with the pain of similar others. Contrary to our expecta-
tions, though, areas involved in self–other distinction or
cognitive control did not show higher activation during
Figure 5. Significant clusters in selected brain regions from the
contrast No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar others. Bars show mean and
90% confidence interval of parameter estimates for the respective
condition (against baseline). See text for abbreviations and Figure 4
for other specifications.
Cluster Size k t x y z Anatomical Location and Area
X 4.90 62 38 34 SMG
X 4.08 56 26 40 SMG/postcentral gyrus
52 5.01 32 52 60 superior parietal lobule
11 4.36 52 34 44 SMG/postcentral gyrus
19 4.32 12 76 44 superior parietal lobule
84 4.27 42 46 50 inferior parietal cortex
Subcortical Areas
17 5.36 14 2 2 striatum (putamen, caudate)
21 4.69 16 16 8 caudate
25 4.33 20 2 0 pallidum/putamen
53 4.10 20 10 6 putamen
X 3.67 18 4 12 caudate
25 4.33 20 2 0 pallidum/putamen
Threshold p = .001 (uncorrected), cluster size threshold k = 20.
Stereotactic coordinates and t values are provided for the local voxel maxima in the respective cluster. X = subpeak of a cluster; cytoarchitectonic
areas (in brackets) determined based upon probabilistic cytoarchitectonic maps provided in the Anatomy Toolbox; PFC = prefrontal cortex; SMA =
supplementary motor area; vPMC = ventral premotor cortex; IFG = inferior frontal gyrus; SMG = supamarginal gyrus.
Table 1. (continued)
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empathy for pain. We speculate that this and the consider-
able overlap in activations results from a mechanism
enabling direct affective sharing with dissimilar others in
situations where no strong emotional response mappings
have been established. In the current paradigm, this was
the case for touch by a Q-tip, which is of neutral valence
for the observer. Notably, the behavioral indices also did
not reveal any differences when the two target groups
underwent painful stimulation. However, although gener-
ally similar processes might be at play during empathy
for pain, a distinction between the two different target
groups is still taking place as indicated by higher hemody-
namic activation in a number of areas when empathizing
with the pain of similar others (see also below). Differences
in the timing of the neural responses to the pain of the
two target groups might not be adequately captured by
the relatively low temporal resolution of hemodynamic
measures, an issue we are currently addressing by a high-
density event-related potential study. In addition, future
investigations should vary the degree and quality of con-
gruent and incongruent emotional response associations
in order to substantiate our claim that empathy for dis-
similar targets can be based on a direct mapping of other-
related responses in the absence of pre-established
emotional response tendencies. From a daily life perspec-
tive, such a direct mapping mechanism has high ecological
validity because, in many cases, it is easier to understand
the feelings of someone else in situations we have never
experienced before (such as, for example, breaking a
bone while never having broken one oneself ).
On the contrary, sharing the (absence of ) feelings in
situations that are distressing or harmful for the self is
much more challenging. This is captured by the behav-
ioral results. Participants not only showed more evalua-
tion errors, longer response times, and more erroneous
pain ratings but also higher personal distress when
watching dissimilar others undergoing injections. The
fMRI results reveal activation increases only when em-
pathy for nonpainful stimulation in dissimilar patients
was required. Compared to the similarly nonpainful stim-
ulation of normal patients, activation increased in a num-
ber of brain areas associated with cognitive control and
perspective-taking (rIFC and dmPFC). Activation was also
increased in areas processing the affective component
of pain (AI and dACC). In addition, trait perspective-
taking skills correlated with hemodynamic responses in
rIFC only when participants were witnessing nonpainful
stimulation.
In many respects, the situation our participants were
exposed to resembles the ones created in task-switching
paradigms. In these paradigms, a previously established
stimulus–response association has to be replaced by a
new association (Monsell, 2003). In the current study, par-
ticipants switched from their own stimulus–response
association to representing how someone dissimilar to
them would respond. In addition to cognitive control
mechanisms, this required assessing the sensory and af-
fective consequences of the witnessed stimulations, that
is, adopting the perspective of the target in order to share
their feelings. Task-switching paradigms demonstrate
the necessity to both inhibit pre-established response
tendencies and to monitor whether this inhibition has to
take place (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen,
2001). As elucidated by neuroimaging and lesion studies,
rIFC plays a decisive role in response inhibition, atten-
tion, and cognitive control (Brass et al., 2005; Aron et al.,
2004; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002). These cognitive func-
tions are predominantly associated with a large area
encompassing the (right) ventral premotor area (pars
opercularis and pars triangularis, cytoarchitectonic areas
44 and 45) and a more posterior cortical region labeled as
the inferior frontal junction area (Brass et al., 2005). This
area was strongly involved in the current study, as indicat-
ed by a large cluster encompassing rIFC. We propose that
activation in this cluster is associated with inhibition of
one’s aversive response when observing painless injec-
tions. In addition to the correlation analysis which suggests
that higher inhibitory control goes along with better self-
reported perspective-taking skill, the PPI results support
this view as well, showing increased connectivity with
areas coding affective representations such as ventral
posterior MCC and the dACC, the periaqueductal gray,
and the right AI. Although PPI analyses do not allow
Figure 6. Significant changes in effective connectivity (contrast
No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar others) between the seed region in
the right inferior frontal cortex and the shown clusters (threshold
p = .001, k = 5, uncorrected). See text for abbreviations and
Figure 4 for other specifications.
Figure 7. Significant changes in effective connectivity (contrast
No Pain: Dissimilar > Similar others) between a seed region in
the right anterior insula and the shown clusters. See text for
abbreviations and Figure 4 for other specifications.
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inferences about the causality of interactions, it is tempting
to interpret them as an increase in inhibitory con-
trol of areas coding one’s own aversive response to the
perceived situation. Future studies, including disruptive
techniques such as transcranial magnetic stimulation,
should therefore assess how specific and causal activation
in rIFC is in regulating empathic responses to dissimilar
others.
Recent reviews (van Overwalle, in press; Amodio &
Frith, 2006) suggest that ventral aspects of mPFC are
primarily associated with thinking about others based
upon one’s own mental representations, whereas dorsal
regions are involved in taking the perspective of
others—in particular when they are dissimilar from the
self (Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; D’Argembeau
et al., 2007; Mitchell et al., 2006). Adopting the subjec-
tive perspective of another individual crucially relies
upon representing two (or more) distinct perspectives,
and upon distinguishing whether they belong to the self
or the other (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Ruby & Decety,
2004). Self–other distinction enables us to generate ap-
propriate self or other-related responses (Meltzoff &
Decety, 2003). A recent meta-analysis assigns an impor-
tant role to dorsal mPFC in pre-response conflict resolu-
tion and in responding under uncertainty (Ridderinkhof,
Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004). Pre-response
conflict resolution and uncertainty are also given when
adopting the perspective of others who respond differ-
ently as we do. Hence, activation in dorsal mPFC might
represent a low-level mechanism for self–other distinc-
tion in the current paradigm. The TPJ has been assigned
a similarly important role for self–other distinction in
previous studies on social cognition (e.g., Decety &
Lamm, 2007; Lamm, Nusbaum, et al., 2007; Farrer et al.,
2004; Ruby & Decety, 2001), and we expected it to play
a crucial role in the present paradigm. The role of the
TPJ in self–other distinction is usually explained by its
multisensory neural connections that allow the match-
ing of (egocentric) somatosensory signals with allocen-
tric information, which is usually conveyed in the visual
or auditory domain. The requirement of perceptual
matching might have been precluded by dmPFC in the
current study, as indicated by its increased connectivity
with visual cortical areas.
A recent combined fMRI and eye-tracking study might
suggest an alternative interpretation of dmPFC activation
(van Reekum et al., 2007). This study demonstrated that
negative responses to emotionally evocative scenes can
be decreased and reappraised by averting one’s gaze
from the visual stimulus, and that dmPFC is substantially
related to such a strategy. Watching injections with non-
painful consequences (i.e., needle injections into dissim-
ilar targets) are particularly prone for such a reappraisal
strategy. We therefore performed a control study in
order to make sure that dmPFC activation in our fMRI
study did not result from different eye movement pat-
terns. Results showed that fixation times for needle
injections into dissimilar others were not significantly
shorter than fixation times for the nonpainful touch
of similar patients—speaking against the interpretation
that dmPFC activation in this study was related to
averted eye gaze. The eye tracking study also showed
that fixation times slightly varied across conditions, and
that painful stimulation of similar others resulted in the
longest looking times. Hence, parts of the effects we
might see in the current as well as in other empathy
paradigms might be attributed to different attentional
and perceptual phenomena. Future studies should at-
tempt to take these processes into account more ex-
plicitly, for example, by recording eye movements during
scanning in order to treat them as a potential covariate.
Apart from a neural network associated with cogni-
tive control and associative learning, areas coding the
affective–motivational aspects of pain, such as ventral
posterior MCC, dACC, AI, and periaqueductal gray, were
also engaged when observing painless needle injections.
As demonstrated by the automaticity localizer, these
activations do not result from an automatic response
triggered by the sight of an injection or aversive stimu-
lation (see also Gu & Han, 2007). Both MCC and the AI
play an important role in empathy for pain, a role that
has been connected to interoceptive awareness (Critchley,
Wiens, Rotshtein, Oehman, & Dolan, 2004; Craig, 2002).
The increased connectivity between right AI and MCC/
ACC during empathy for a nonpainful situation might
result from the process of evaluating the affective conse-
quences of the shown situations, as opposed to the actual
outcome of the evaluation. This is in line with activation
in these areas when participants evaluated the ‘‘painful’’
consequences of a Q-tip touching similar others (data not
shown), as well as with previous results showing that
evaluating ‘‘pain’’ caused by nonpainful stimuli also trig-
gers activation in the insula and MCC (Lamm, Nusbaum,
et al., 2007; Lamm & Decety, unpublished data).
In addition to the insights gained for how we respond
to dissimilar others, this study also makes an important
contribution toward how we understand similar others.
Current accounts of empathy suggest that attending to
another’s affective state activates representations of that
state in the observer, along with their corresponding
somatic and autonomic responses (e.g., Preston & de
Waal, 2002). Our results extend this hypothesis by show-
ing that somatosensory areas present stronger activa-
tion when we empathize with the pain of someone
whose sensory experiences and response-tendencies
we share (contrast Pain: Similar > Dissimilar). The
independent localization of the hand area combined
with activation contralateral to the stimulated hand sug-
gests, for the first time in such a specific manner for
an fMRI study, that primary somatosensory representa-
tions are shared on the level of the affected body part.
A limitation of the current study is the use of stimuli
which did not allow to infer the affective state of the tar-
get from overt affective displays (such as facial or vocal
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expressions), but instead had to be based solely upon
previously provided context information. This design
was chosen on purpose because we explicitly wanted to
know how we infer affective states without relying upon
emotional contagion or direct perception–action cou-
pling. Future studies should therefore investigate the role
of cognitive control in situations which convey the target’s
affective state to the observer directly.
Conclusion
Empathizing with someone whose bodily and affective
representations are distinct from our own is a task requir-
ing the integration of cognitive control with process-
es of self–other distinction and perspective-taking (see
Karniol, 2003). These processes crucially rely on execu-
tive functions for activating relevant representations and
keeping them active while inhibiting irrelevant ones. The
fact that all of our participants were able to correctly
infer the affective state of the dissimilar patients demon-
strates the mental flexibility of the human mind. Notably,
it seems that sharing the pain triggered by a situation
with neutral emotional valence for the observer relies
upon the same mechanisms as sharing the pain of some-
one who is like us. Behavioral and neural indicators,
however, suggest that it is more challenging (yet without
doubt possible) to share the affect of dissimilar others
in a situation that is aversive for the observer. This flexi-
bility is a cornerstone of our ability to empathize with
diverse others—from animals to anthropomorphized
objects such as pets to people from different cultural
backgrounds. The current study casts new light on the
neural mechanisms involved in this mental f lexibility.
It also contributes to our understanding of the funda-
mental mechanisms involved in empathy by showing that
emotion contagion and perception–action coupling do
not represent the only route to empathy for pain. Rather,
our results support a model of empathy that involves
a complex interaction between bottom–up (i.e., direct
matching between perception and action) and top–down
(i.e., regulation and control) information processes (Lamm,
Porges, Cacioppo, & Decety, 2008; Decety & Lamm, 2006;
Goubert et al., 2005; Decety & Jackson, 2004). The low
level, which is automatically activated (unless inhibited) by
perceptual input, accounts for emotion sharing. Executive
functions, implemented in prefrontal cortex, serve to regu-
late both cognition and emotion, notably through selective
attention and self-regulation.
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